The Russian Window

Vladimir Putin has been gifted a window of opportunity to indulge in his revanchist ambitions if he has the resolve to exercise them.  For all the Western prognosticating on Russian intentions in light of the recent Russian military buildup on the Ukrainian border, far too little focus has been directed on the current strategic conditions that represent near-ideal circumstances for Russia to engage in further military operations against Ukraine, while limiting international repercussions.

Whether Putin’s aims during such an operation would be limited or a general invasion of conquest is a subject of intense debate, and likely known only to the Russian President.  While casualties and equipment losses could be severe in either case, Russia still currently has a sufficient military capability to force a favorable outcome.  Presupposing any losses during the fighting and the cost of subsequent occupation and rebuilding were acceptable to Putin, the reaction from the EU and NATO remains the biggest deterrent element he faces.  Or is it?

While Putin provides the military muscle, to a great extent, it is Western political leaders who are providing the political environment crucial to his success.  Currently, there have been no significant deterrence measures taken against Russia in response to its military buildup and increasing pro-war/anti-west propaganda.  There have been no additional sanctions levied by the EU, G7, or the US.  Significant reluctance has already been expressed on even discussing sanctions by several European states.  There has been no significant deployment of additional NATO assets to the eastern flank of the alliance, nor has there been a significant increase in the military aid being sent to Ukraine.  The only thing President Biden and European leaders have committed to do is talk.  Nothing more.

This tells Putin the West has neither the will nor, in some cases, the capability to oppose further Russian military action in Ukraine.  If the European powers do suddenly coalesce in strident opposition to Russian aggression, Russia can play the natural gas card mid-winter when European supplies are low.  The hint of such a threat to shut off natural gas supplies to Europe has already skyrocketed energy prices to such a degree that American exporters are directing LNG loaded vessels into European ports to take advantage of the shortage. 

President Biden has similarly declined to support Ukraine seriously, aside from diplomatic engagement with Moscow and a small increase in the military aid given to Kyiv.  Moreover, the US military is still reeling from its defeat in Afghanistan, struggling to reorient away from counterinsurgency operations back toward peer-level conflict, and suffering from low morale and an erosion of public confidence.  The situation is not conducive to new deployments, and the Europeans are unlikely to engage in unilateral deployments without US support.

Of course, Ukraine and its military would vigorously resist a renewed Russian offensive into its territory and fortunately, Ukraine has vastly improved its own posture in the intervening 7 years since the Russian invasion of 2014.  Its 120,000 military personnel of 2014 has increased to over a quarter million active duty personnel, with almost a million more reservists that could be called on in the event of war.  What it lacks is enough modern weaponry to arm these personnel to a level that would make them effective against Russian forces.  Bowing to Putin, Germany has actually attempted to block arms shipments, as reports recently revealed, and the US has shied away from aggressively supplying Kyiv’s needs.  This deficiency, and the failure of NATO to address it, are immense gifts to Russia.

Russia now has a window of opportunity to act against Ukraine without suffering the severe international consequences it otherwise might and before Ukraine can fully arm herself.  Analysts have widely recognized the need for the seasonal Rasputitsa (mud) in Ukraine to freeze before an invasion with heavy armored and mechanized forces could begin.  This is true, and the December-January time frame for such a freeze coincides with the kind of heavy winter energy use in Western Europe that will make it most sensitive to Russian threats to cut off its supplies of natural gas.  Therefore, if Russia moves, she will do so in winter, after the freeze.

Putin must act before the democracies that might otherwise oppose him can sort out their internal issues.  The Europeans finally being embarrassed or shamed into reorienting themselves away from dependence on Russian natural gas could remove a major element of leverage Russia will use to shield herself from repercussion from a Ukrainian invasion.  While the near lunatic hatred of various European green parties for fossil fuels and nuclear energy alike make this unlikely (they continue to champion more “green” sources as the solution even now), and in fact have directly engineered Russia’s leverage in this matter, a major European land war could shatter this position for the public.  Fortunately for Russia, absent an actual invasion of Ukraine, these policies are unlikely to change.  However, the longer this period of tension continues, the more likely the European elements of NATO are to act in some way, just to be seen doing something. 

On the American front, President Biden is an unimaginable gift to Putin.  Feckless, weak, incompetent, and widely mocked by his own nation, Biden already has a string of foreign policy disasters to his credit after less than a year in office.  His refusal to lead NATO on the issue of Ukraine and persistent public statements that he wishes to talk to Putin, coupled with tepid support for Ukraine, indicate an unwillingness by his administration to seriously oppose Russia.  Unfortunately for Moscow, the US is set to endure another round of elections in 2022, and they do not look good for the President’s party.  A hardline American Congress could force a spineless Biden Administration to take action whether it wants to or not.  Massive arms shipments to Ukraine, coupled with intelligence sharing, and other modes of support would make any invasion much more difficult.

While Ukraine has been franticly rearming out of her own resources,  unfortunately, those resources are somewhat limited, and outside support has been sporadic.  If Russia wishes to strike again, it must do so before Ukraine can become more fully armed with Western quality weapons.  Overrunning a determined, but poorly armed Ukrainian military would be a far easier task than confronting that same force after political changes potentially open up the floodgates of foreign aid.  For Putin, the sooner, the better.

If President Putin is prepared to accept the costs of the invasion and occupation of all or part of Ukraine, it is unlikely there will ever be a better time than now to launch offensive operations.  Europe is irresolute, economically compromised, and politically fractured.  Ukraine is determined, but poorly equipped to stand off another invasion.  The United States is bereft of the leadership that might otherwise rectify these problems.  It is unlikely that such a confluence of favorable conditions will reoccur before Ukraine and the West can strengthen their positions.  If the military solution is the one favored by Moscow, it should invade Ukraine early in the new year.