Russian activity in Ukraine and the Western response to it have highlighted a reemerging truth: NATO and Russia speak two separate languages when it comes to international relations. This disparity of mindset has contributed markedly to the West’s inability to bridge the credibility gap between its statements and actions, hampering its efforts to deter Russian aggression. As the aggressing power, Russia will continue to drive the crisis in Ukraine. The West must learn to speak to Putin in a way he understands if it wishes to deter future aggression.
Vladimir Putin is perhaps the ultimate realist, in the worst sense of that term. A former counter-intelligence officer with the KGB, Putin’s brand of realpolitik values force. He has no respect for and does not value international norms, treaties, agreements, or institutions, save when it benefits him to do so. It is no surprise then that Putin seems unperturbed by all the West’s talk of sanctions and repercussions in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. At the end of the day, he knows that the international pressure will eventually dissipate and Russian troops will remain where he put them.
The West, by contrast, is headed by Wilsonian internationalists who view norms, treaties, and institutions as sacrosanct. They have a difficult time coming to grips with the fact that there still exists a leader who views the use of military force to acquire territory as acceptable (and sometimes preferable). Unfortunately, when they condemn what they regard as Putin’s rogue state actions, they use terminology that simply does not register with his realpolitik mindset. Continued refusal by NATO to shadow Russian force buildup/exercises with corresponding allied operations within NATO territory only underlines the credibility gap between their deterrence rhetoric, and the actions they are willing to take to halt Russian aggression.
Having discussed Putin and outlined his worldview, his opposite numbers in both NATO and the United States deserve some examination in order to illustrate the contrast between Presidents Putin and Biden and Secretary-General of NATO Stoltenberg. Jens Stoltenberg, a career Norwegian politician and former Prime Minister of Norway, has been Secretary-General of NATO since 2014 – the same year Russia invaded and annexed Crimea. In 2015 he said "I believe we don't see any immediate threat against any NATO country from the east… Our goal is still cooperation with Russia…” While recently chastising Russia for non-transparency in its military buildup along the border with Ukraine, he offered continued training and material assistance to the Ukrainian Government and reaffirmed that NATO does not and “will not accept Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea.” He also called on Russia to reduce tensions. Stoltenberg as the titular head of NATO ought, along with US President Biden, to be reading Russia the riot act over its blatant and unprovoked aggression towards its neighbors. Instead, he seems to think internationalist word salad will impress a realpolitik carnivore like Putin.
Putin knows that as the driver of this crisis he is in complete control. He can ramp up or reduce the level of tension as he chooses, regardless of NATO’s wishes, because NATO has not imposed a cost for his behavior and is unlikely to do so. The NATO Secretary-General can give as many speeches about refusing to recognize the annexation of Crimea as he likes, Russian troops are still occupying that territory and NATO has taken no steps, political or military, that would force their removal. Moreover, what the Sec. Gen. did not say was the most important part of that speech: he did not announce any defense commitment or re/deployment of NATO forces in response to the Russian buildup along Ukraine’s borders. Stoltenberg has surrendered the initiative to the Russians.
The American example (and leadership) is no better. President Joe Biden has rapidly become one of the most incompetent and widely mocked leaders in his nation’s history, while internationally his tenure has been marked by a series of disasters. The termination of the Afghan War was a colossal military failure that strained the NATO alliance, producing severe tensions and recriminations between the US and its allies. The Biden administration helped to derail the Franco-Australian submarine deal, infuriating the French and causing them to withdraw their ambassador from Washington for the first time in the history of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The removal of sanctions from the Nordstream-2 Project, reversing the previous administration’s stance, was a major gift of economic leverage to the Russians and a reward for the feckless foreign policy of the Germans. All of this considerable damage to American credibility has been accomplished in the first eleven months of his presidency and is in addition to President Biden’s own very questionable personal qualities as a world leader.
From the Russian perspective, this is a domestically weakened and embattled American President who already has a track record of military and foreign policy disasters, despite being in office less than a year. While transcripts for the most recent face-to-face teleconference between Biden and Putin have not been released, the US State Department indicated Biden promised unprecedented sanctions and other measures should Russia invade Ukraine again. Without knowing the details, there are still two problems with that response. First, Biden’s own history of going soft on previous Russian sanctions renders his threats less credible than they might otherwise be. Second, increased troop deployment to the region should be done prior to any Russian invasion as a deterrence measure. Sending them after invasion begins is useless in a deterrence capacity unless you plan to actually use them in support of Ukraine which Biden says he categorically will not.
So far Putin has no reason to take NATO seriously because NATO has not yet given him one. What it has given him is a great deal of rhetoric, minor troop deployments, isolated and intermittent sanctions, and inaction. This tells him that as long as he is willing to weather the resulting (likely temporary) sanctions, Russia can do as it wishes in Ukraine. This then begs the question, “How could NATO deter Russia?”
The deterrence of Russian aggression comes in three forms: diplomatic, economic, and military. The first two must be exercised especially aggressively in order to be effective. Whatever measures are used, NATO must develop a strategic game plan for deterrence and execute it. As it stands, the alliance has allowed Russia to set the pace of escalation and manipulate events along a timetable most beneficial to Moscow. This is especially dangerous as it allows an aggressive Russia to control events without being forced to reexamine the strategic situation in light of NATO counter moves. Impeding this strategic momentum is a worthwhile goal in and of itself.
Diplomatically, NATO has few active options. As previously discussed, Russian respect for international diplomacy is limited, and few methods of formal direct censure are available to NATO member states. Ejecting diplomats and suspected intelligence operatives is only of limited value and Russia will veto any meaningful moves at the UN. Therefore, NATO diplomacy should be focused on areas outside Russia that pose concerns to Moscow. Using Russian aggression in Ukraine to pitch NATO membership to Finland and possibly Sweden is a prime example. Moscow complains vociferously that it is being encircled, but ironically it has now given NATO an opportunity to further tighten that circle, by showing additional nations on Russia’s borders that they are not safe from its depredations unless they join NATO.
Internally NATO can also do some housecleaning of members who have not been living up to their commitments to the alliance. Certain large, economically strong members chronically refuse to carry their fair share of the mutual defense burden by refusing to meet or come close to NATO’s 2% of GDP minimum for defense spending. Removing their voting rights, or threatening the expulsion of members who fail to maintain a credible military force capable of assisting in the mutual defense, or those that undermine NATOs economic security – Articles 3 and 2 of the NATO Charter respectively – would send a strong and long overdue message both internally and externally. Internal reform along these lines has been badly needed for decades and this presents a good opportunity to initiate it.
Economically, NATO is in much better shape. For all its rejection of international norms, Russia and its ruling clique are highly dependent on its energy exports and access to the international banking and payments systems. Reducing Russian access to European energy markets and to those critical banking services would severely pressure both the nation as a whole and the oligarchs, whom even Putin must be wary of offending. Freezing or seizing assets and accounts linked to the Russian Government, its prominent citizens, and corporations as a retaliatory measure for aggression is well precedented. Moreover, these measures can be targeted at those individuals and entities most in a position to pressure Putin.
Cutting Russia off from major sources of international energy revenue is a more time-consuming prospect, but also carries with it significant long term benefits. European NATO members pay Gazprom, Russia’s state energy exporter, billions of dollars a year for its products. Many of these same products are produced in the volumes necessary for export within the United States and Canada – especially natural gas. A concerted effort by the alliance and its members to redirect energy and other imports away from Russian sources and toward neutral or ideally, NATO aligned exporting nations might be somewhat slow and perhaps more expensive. However, it would profoundly impact the Russian economy and defang a major point of leverage Russia continues to hold over much of Europe.
This article assumes direct overt military action against Russian interests is a nonstarter. Nevertheless, NATO’s indirect military options are numerous. They range from significantly enhanced direct aid to Ukraine, all the way to the initiation of allied grey-zone operations in the conflict zones of Ukraine. While even deniable direct action carries serious risk, most of the military options available are both non-confrontational and send a clear message to Putin.
Secretary-General Stoltenberg, to his credit, has continued to emphasize aid in the form of equipment and training to non-NATO members under threat of Russian aggression. Building up friendly “non-allied” nations to the point their internal strength causes Moscow to reassess the cost-benefit analysis of direct action anywhere in the region is a critical deterrence goal. It allows NATO to function as the proverbial “Arsenal of Democracy” without significant risk to itself. It also serves to more closely align these “non-allied” nations with NATO through the use of common equipment and the personal military contacts related to training and support that come with it. Given current tensions, aid programs should be increased wherever possible – to the point of lend-lease status if necessary – and they should be carried out at least semi-openly. The goal is not only to strengthen Ukraine and Russia’s “non-allied” neighbors, but for Russia to see these nations being strengthened by NATO.
Internally NATO can take significant military action to both preposition itself and send an unambiguous signal to Putin that aggression will be responded to. During the Trump administration, Poland offered to permanently billet a US armored division on its soil. These talks should be openly restarted with an eye towards the forward deployment of the 1st Armored Division, along with the headquarters elements of a reactivated US VII Corps within Poland. If talks are successful, the 1st and 3rd US Infantry Divisions should be openly reorganized into the VII Corps command structure and forward posts established for them. This sends an especially poignant message to a cold warrior like Putin, who will recall that VII Corps was a major component of NATO’s old Army Group Center (CENTAG) based in West Germany during the Cold War and specifically designed to resist a Russian/Warsaw Pact invasion. If Russia wishes to behave like the USSR, NATO should be prepared to treat it accordingly.
Alternatively, NATO can also take significant action without major troop deployments from the US. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) is a brigade-sized, combined arms rapid reaction force specifically stood up following the last Russian invasion of Ukraine in order to allow NATO to move swiftly in the face of further aggression. It should be activated immediately along with its two reinforcement brigades, its constituent components assembled, and deployed for an extensive period of training and integration exercises in preparation for possible real-world crisis deployment.
Where it does this training is potentially critical. Poland or Romania would place it in a NATO member state bordering Ukraine and therefore close to the point of likely conflict while remaining in NATO territory. Should President Zelensky specifically request a joint training exercise, the VJTF could conceivably conduct this division-sized training operation in western Ukraine. While remote from the potential areas of Russian incursion, this calculated signal would be seen as provocative in the extreme from a Russian point of view. It does several things for NATO:
First, reminiscent of Syria, it establishes a NATO deconfliction tripwire in Ukraine that Putin will have to recognize and hesitate to cross, and it does so without NATO formally committing itself to the defense of Ukraine. This removes the troublesome Article 5 issue of Ukraine joining the alliance while portions of its territory are still occupied by Russia. Second, it sends an unambiguous message to Putin that his antics have reached a stage NATO is no longer prepared to tolerate and that the alliance is prepared to act in unconventional ways to respond. Third, it sets a narrative trap. Diplomatically Russia will almost certainly characterize this as an act of NATO aggression. But how can Russia object to NATO trainers in western Ukraine, while Russia itself occupies eastern Ukraine? NATO can easily use this charge to highlight Russian troops on Ukrainian soil in Crimea, its continued participation in the proxy war going on in the Donbas Region of Ukraine, and to remind other “non-allied” nations that border Russia that they could be next on Moscow’s agenda.
The most potentially escalatory measure NATO could take would be to fight fire with fire and embrace proxy war in the Donbas and Crimea. Unlike the other measures listed above, this would have to be a completely deniable measure, carried out without formal recognition of any kind. Its impact would be somewhat delayed, but potentially more pointed: increased Russian casualties. American and allied Special Forces units, especially Polish GROM and British Special Forces have just concluded their operations in a two decade long counter-insurgency war. The level of combat experience accrued by these formations in the War on Terror is hard to overemphasize and would give them a definite edge over Russian deniable assets operating in the area. The damage they, or NATO military personnel operating officially as PMCs under contract to Kyiv, could do to Russian assets in the field is significant in terms of personnel, morale, material, and local support. Operational realities also mean that eventually NATO would take casualties, and the potential for provable discovery of these forces by Russia carries a major risk of conflict escalation. This option is the riskiest both politically and militarily and is therefore the least likely to be employed.
None of these options should be taken in isolation, and all are viable within the context of their inherent limitations. A combination of them should be employed by NATO with the overarching goal of speaking to Putin in the language he understands. Rhetoric alone is not enough. The objective must be to increase the political, economic, and military costs – real and potential – of any Russian aggression to the point that Moscow views aggression as an unattractive strategy.
Good stuff. Thank you.