Russian merchant shipping has recently been caught transporting what appears to be grain confiscated from Ukrainian territory by Russian invasion forces into Syria. While watching Russia supply a murderous client state with their stolen grain may be adding insult to injury for the Ukrainians, it is also an opportunity. So, dear readers, it’s once again time to F*ck with Vlad! Today, we’re hoisting the black flag.
Privateering has a long and storied history in the Age of Sail but was largely abolished by the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law. While (Imperial) Russia was a signatory to the declaration, Ukraine is not, as it was a subjugated nation under Russian rule at the time. This gives Kyiv an opportunity to combat modern Russian aggression with a somewhat antique solution.
Privateers are ostensibly private vessels outfitted and crewed by private citizens. These vessels and their crews are granted Letters of Marque and Reprisal authorizing them, in the name of the issuing government, to attack the shipping of nations hostile to the issuing government. The privateers then attack and seek to capture merchant shipping and their cargos belonging to those hostile powers, then sell both ship and cargo in a neutral or friendly port after adjudication by a prize court. Some portion of the proceeds are sometimes paid to the issuing government, but the bulk of the profits remain with the privateers. The chance for licensed piracy on the high seas with its corresponding potential for vast profits has historically enabled nations with little to no naval power of their own to recruit semi-official raiders to prey on enemy shipping.
Nor are these raiders required to fly the flag of the power issuing their Letter of Marque. Historically many would be vessels flagged in non-belligerent third party nations, or would simply use the flag of such a nation as a legitimate ruse de guerre, until they initiated an attack. At which point the flag of their issuing power would be run up for the battle. This made them difficult to find and destroy by hostile naval forces, unless the privateer was particularly infamous and well known. Firing on a vessel from an ostensibly neutral power is an act of war, whatever the suspicions might be harbored about the activity of the vessel.
The question then becomes how might Ukraine make use of such a tactic? The Ukrainian Government could authorize its ambassadors to issue Letters of Marque from its embassies around the world. Those applicants acceptable to the Ukrainian Government would then be officially registered with their vessels as auxiliary units in the Ukrainian Navy. They would be authorized to destroy or capture Russian flagged shipping, wherever it may be found.
Such vessels, operating under their home nations’ flags until initiating their attacks, would then be in a position to prey on Russian grain shipments to Syria in the Mediterranean, or Russian oil tankers for an especially lucrative cargo, anywhere in the world. Grain shipments in particular would find a ready market in Egypt, a nation in close proximity to the likely zones of privateer operation and already expressing concerns about possible shortages. Egypt, it should be remembered, is no stranger to food riots. The captured vessels could also be sold in addition to the captured cargos.
At a minimum, this provides Ukraine a way to strike at Russia. It potentially also gives Kyiv a source of income and reduces the ability of Russia to profit from resources stolen from Ukraine. Lastly, it has some potential to foster goodwill in nations that might critically require the various cargos seized from Russian vessels.
From a non-Ukrainian point of view, there are several ways to facilitate this process. The first would be for the government of NATO member states to explicitly allow their citizens to accept Letters of Marque. Second, NATO can continue to maintain a strong naval and air presence in the Mediterranean to ensure any retaliation by Russia would have to occur during an attack when the privateer is under the Ukrainian flag. Third, the adjudication and disposition of captured vessels and their cargos could be facilitated by friendly prize courts acting for the Ukrainian Government, set up in neutral and NATO member state ports.
Russia is almost certain to respond to this measure. In the short term, Moscow would likely react in much the same way western companies did to Somali pirates – by putting armed personnel on board ships in dangerous waters. Long term, Russia would likely seek non-Russian flagged vessels to carry its cargos so as to avoid privateer attacks. There is also significant potential for Russian naval deployment to the region to either actively hunt down privateers or escort merchant vessels singly or in convoy. The behavior and observed rules of engagement of any Russian naval assets deployed to this endeavor would dictate future privateering operations to some degree. Their mere presence would not necessarily mean the cessation of privateering depending on Ukraine’s (or those nations supplying Ukraine with weaponry) willingness to provide its privateers with heavy anti-ship weaponry.
As with previous offerings, this article is meant to showcase an option to act against Russia in an unconventional manner. For Ukraine, it would be both unconventional and conducted on a front in which Russia has previously enjoyed total immunity. It is not a war winning measure, but it is an opportunity to make the war more painful for Russia. For the West, again in keeping with previous offerings, it allows non-belligerent nations friendly to Ukraine’s cause to assist Kyiv without directly confronting Russia and forcing a confrontation. It’s time to introduce Vlad to the joys of modern commerce raiding.
Great idea. Peter Zeihan talked about this type of action in his new book.