Breaking the Stalemate

Air Power is the Key

As the war in Ukraine drags on, the prospect increases that it may become a long term stalemate, unless the current dynamic is fundamentally changed.  As it stands, Russian forces have largely fought themselves out and Ukrainian troops thus far have achieved only limited offensive capability. Barring a major breakthrough or collapse, this stalemated conflict is likely to continue for at least the remainder of the year and into 2024.   Beyond that the outcome is unclear.  If current levels of western support could be maintained, this war might resolve into a frozen conflict that grinds on for years.  If western will and support erode over time, then the outcome is even more dire. Neither is a pleasant prospect, especially for the poor suffering people of Ukraine.  Time is not on our side.

Ukraine has been kept alive for the past year by the courage of its people and the flow of western military aid.  While so far there seems to be no limits to the courage and resilience of the Ukrainian people to endure this terrible ordeal, there are clear limits to the amount of immediately available military aid from NATO and the productive capacity of western defense industries to provide more, as well as limits to the political will of western leaders to continue sending it.  At some point during the next 12 to 18 months, this stalemate will likely become unsustainable for both the Ukrainians and the Western nations supporting them. 

The surest and most likely way forward to ending this nightmare for the Ukrainian people is to expel Russian forces from their country.[1] Peace and security will only return to Ukraine when the Russian Army (or what’s left of it) returns to Russia.  Russian leaders, being apparently insensitive to their own massive losses, are unlikely to reverse themselves and leave Ukraine of their own accord. So unfortunately therefore, Russian forces must be crushed and forced to go home.  Easier said than done.  The best current hope to accomplish that sort of victory is Ukraine’s long heralded spring offensive, for which they have assembled an impressive force of nine newly trained combat brigades armed with western equipment.  But whether this force will wield sufficient combat power to achieve a war winning breakthrough remains to be seen and many observers are skeptical.  

The war in Ukraine has certainly been an odd one by any modern military standard.  Reminiscent of early 20^th century conflicts, artillery rather than tactical airpower has played the primary support role for both belligerents.  This is largely due to the lethality of modern air defense weapons and the reluctance of both sides to incur significant aircraft losses.  This forces both sides into an over reliance on artillery, which creates an outsized Ukrainian demand for great quantities of artillery systems and ammunition that is severely straining western defense stocks.  The Ukrainian Defense Minister recently remarked that the Ukrainian Armed Forces could easily dispose of 600,000 shells a month.  This is well beyond the current capacity of NATO and other friendly nations to supply. 

Clearly the war must be brought to a swifter end than is possible under current conditions using the weapons currently available to the Ukrainian armed forces. This means easing the existing constraints on the types of western weapons available to them.  Practically speaking, the best way to break the stalemate and decisively break the Russian Army is to enable Ukraine to fight on modern terms, that is to wage war from the air.  Western aircraft and related ordnance must go to Kyiv.

The provision of western aircraft, specifically F-16’s, would solve a number of critical challenges hampering Ukrainian forces.  First it would reduce the current strain on our wholly inadequate Western defense industries to supply ever increasing numbers of artillery shells.  By contrast F-16 airframes are plentiful, their munitions and supplies have been stockpiled by multiple nations – many of them in Europe.

Second, the F-16 can operate with greater speed and flexibility and at greater ranges than artillery can hope to match and do so with a significant volume and variety of ordnance.  One of the reasons for the increasingly hi-tech and elaborate artillery munitions being shipped to Ukraine is the inherent range limitation of artillery ammunition – no matter how advanced.  While the F-16 does require significant maintenance, it can also deliver more ordnance to a target in a single sortie than most Ukrainian artillery crews are comfortable putting on target before displacing for fear of counter battery fire.  The F-16C Block 50/52 models are rated to carry around 17,000lbs of munitions.  By contrast the M107 155mm artillery round weighs about 95lbs.

Third, the variety of missions the F-16 can be tasked to will be key.  Any introduction of aircraft into the Russo-Ukrainian War will present a tall job for the pilots and airframes involved.  Enemy air defenses will need to be reduced first to allow greater freedom of operation.  Tactical and strategic targets will need to be struck in Russian rear areas to inhibit their operations.  Ukrainian ground forces will need close air support.  The F-16 is designed to fill each these roles.

Opponents of this proposal have some reasonable concerns and invariably point out a number of hurdles.  They worry that the spectacle of US made aircraft striking Russian personnel will be escalatory, potentially provoking a direct response against NATO.  Some also suggest more weapons to Ukraine will prolong the war in general.  Experienced military pilots correctly worry that 4^th generation aircraft going up against the best Russian air defenses may suffer significant casualties.  This last concern is the most reasonable and serious of them.

Historically proxy wars between great powers have always been fought with deniable assets.  Never has this resulted in nuclear escalation by either the United States of the Soviet Union.  Make no mistake; Ukraine for the US is in part a proxy war.  We are assisting the Ukrainians in defending their nation both for humanitarian reasons, but also because degrading Russian military capability is in our best interests, just as Russia has attempted this against us in the past.

For context, a bit of history is helpful.  During the Korea War, Russian pilots famously flew against UN forces piloting MiG-15 aircraft donated by Joe Stalin that were wearing North Korean markings. The 64^th Independent Fighter Aviation Corps was known to be an active participant in the war by NATO intelligence services, its personnel were responsible for the deaths of numerous American air crewmen.  The USSR never acknowledged the presence of its military personnel in the conflict.  And the United States never launched a nuclear attack on Russia in retaliation.  That’s how the game was played.

During the Vietnam War Russian advisors were instrumental in assisting, and crewing, North Vietnamese air defense batteries directly engaging US aircraft.  Virtually all of the systems were of Russian design and the USSR sent advisors to train NVA crews on their use against the United States.  The People’s Republic of China similarly assisted the NVA with advisors, safe haven bases, and war materiel.  Despite losing that war, the United States never employed nuclear weapons to stabilize its position.  It has to be pointed out that neither of these wars were fought on America’s doorstep, as is the case for Russia in Ukraine, but the lessons of these earlier conflicts do apply nevertheless.  The presence of F-16’s in Ukraine will not equal war between NATO and Russia.

The argument against supplying aircraft for fear of high losses is a legitimate criticism.  However, it is born of a post Cold War mindset that is especially prevalent in the USAF.  The expectation that airmen should be able to fight a relatively risk free war in uncontested skies and without suffering serious losses reflects the Iraq/GWOT experience, but not the realities of a near peer conflict.  That golden age of uncontested US air supremacy following the end of the Cold War with near zero losses despite multiple conflicts was an historic anomaly and it’s over.  In a peer or near peer level conflict, there will be losses and they may be significant. That was the reality and expectation for air combat up until the early 1990’s and that reality has returned in Ukraine and may be seen again over the Taiwan Straits.

Moreover, the primary way military forces learn to use their equipment effectively against a specific enemy is in combat.  The first Gulf War went remarkably smoothly despite some aircraft losses for the coalition forces, because American aircrews during the Vietnam war paid dearly to acquire the knowledge of how to defeat Soviet era air defenses.  The price was high, but those high loss rates drove the US military to develop the weapons and tactics necessary to locate, evade and destroy Soviet air defense systems, the same types of systems later used by the Iraqi Army.  The need and urgency to develop that knowledge didn’t originate in think tanks or around wargame tables in the Pentagon.  It resulted unfortunately from tragic losses suffered in combat.

The story of the USAF F-105 during the Vietnam War is perhaps the best illustration of how costly acquiring this type of combat experience, and its resulting doctrines, can be.   Republic Aviation would build a total of 833 F-105’s during their production run.  Their primary role, especially in the early days of the conflict, was to act as ground attack aircraft.  Eventually many would specialize in the ‘Wild Weasel’ role, hunting enemy surface to air missile batteries.  395 of them would be lost in the Vietnam War, the vast majority to enemy action. 

The point regarding 4^th Gen aircraft facing off against advanced air defenses may be valid, but if carried to its logical conclusion it paints a disturbing picture.  The majority of US aircraft are still 4^th Gen airframes.  If a conflict with the PRC develops any time in the near future those same airframes will be required to conduct operations against similar PRC air defenses.  Better to learn how to effectively use 4^th Gen F-16s with western weapons and tactics against S-400’s in the Russo-Ukrainian War than to approach the problem cold over the straits of Taiwan later.

Russian propaganda will paint any delivery of major western systems, including the tanks and AFV/APCs recently delivered to Ukraine, as a massive escalation.  When they go into action and inflict losses on Russian personnel, the Russian government will threaten retaliation.  That is as far as it will go.  For the simple reason that their military is struggling to contain the Ukrainian Armed Forces, confrontation with the West will mean an existential threat to Russia.  Russia knows this and will not risk the survival of the nation over a war of choice in Ukraine.

Nor is the numerically impressive Russian Air Force the threat it might appear to be on paper.  The Russian ability to replace lost airframes is minimal.  Russian aircrews are of a dubious quality, and the specter of having to replace massive losses in their air force is not one Russian industry can hope to meet.  If the Russian Air Force chooses to commit itself against a well supplied Ukrainian Air Force equipped with western airframes, and potentially western pilots, it will suffer the fate of the Russian Army.  The Russian Army, furthermore, is in no way resilient enough to sustain operations while under a constant Ukrainian air threat.

 This is not to say the introduction of F-16’s would be without issue.  The training time for experienced pilots is still a matter of months, inexperienced pilots is longer, ground crews to service the planes is longer still.  The solution I have argued before is to use western contractors to fill both roles until Ukrainian personnel can be sufficiently trained on these airframes.  After which a gradual change over can occur to replace these contractors with home grown air and ground crews.

This war must be brought to a close. The suffering of the Ukrainian people must end.  Western support fatigue is already beginning to manifest in both the will and ability to supply Ukrainian requirements.  The economic damage it continues to generate is having an impact on the global economy.   Perhaps as importantly the US will have to pivot to Asia in the near future in order to confront the growing threat of the PRC.  Doing so will be far easier with the Russo-Ukrainian War already a settled issue.

Modern aircraft will allow Ukraine to reclaim the high ground and unlock the current near-stalemate this war has devolved into.  Their introduction will not be cost free in money, equipment, or the lives of the aircrews who fly them.  It would, however, be decisive.  The only question is whether the Americans and Europeans have the will to take that step.

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[1] Calls for a negotiated settlement to this war are greeted with justified skepticism, as that approach requires good faith from both parties and an effective enforcement mechanism, neither of which is likely to be present in dealing with Vladimir Putin.