It’s a thorny issue. The NATO charter has no statutory means of compelling the alliance members. Regardless of their behavior, it cannot sanction or expel members once they are admitted to the alliance. This is despite the charter requiring certain behavior of the alliance members in the text of articles II and III as it relates to defense, economic, and foreign policy. Without an enforcement mechanism internally, or externally in the form of an omnipresent threat as existed during the Cold War, free riding has become endemic.

The resulting European military deficiencies have arguably been a contributing factor (one of many) to increased Russian aggression against unaligned states on its borders. This has prompted a large increase in American resources deployed for the protection of our European allies, and over $100B in direct aid to Ukraine to assist that nation against the Russian invasion. All while American strategists look at PRC aggression, and several other hot spots in the Middle East and Asia, with growing apprehension. In an increasingly hostile geopolitical landscape, the US needs its allies to be militarily robust and capable of mounting a credible local defense against regional hostile actors.

There is no material reason that (primarily Western) European NATO shouldn’t be able to accomplish this. On the whole, these nations have both the wealth and population to field credible military forces in line with their national limitations. In general, they choose not to and they have gotten away with that choice for decades.

In 1989, US forces accounted for 40% of all active duty NATO personnel. Today, among the 1989 allies, that number has risen to 47%. Even factoring in the new additions from former Warsaw Pact nations and neutrals, that number edges upward slightly to 41%.1

Unfortunately, despite some reported spending increases2, the corresponding increases in numbers have not materialized. Poland has indicated it wishes to increase the size of its forces to 300,000 personnel - by far the most aggressive planned increase of any NATO member, whether or not that target is attained remains to be seen. The UK by contrast is moving forward with plans to reduce its army to 72,500 troops by 2025, the smallest the British Army has been since the Napoleonic Wars.

As the Russo-Ukrainian War is proving once more, military mass matters. What a nation is capable of taking to war tomorrow in the event of a crisis is at least as important as overall defense spending. Currently, there may be some reform on the horizon for the latter, but precious little effort is being devoted to the former, with notable exceptions.

How then should the US go about inducing the European allies to both spend more and increase their force levels to a point where they can effectively defend themselves without massive US support being required at all times? Presidents Bush and Obama both attempted to exert conventional pressure in this arena with limited success. Even overt threats by President Trump, in a much more strident departure from his two predecessors, only produced modest changes. What moves the needle for European politicians is the perceived risk to their own nations. This is why the Russo-Ukrainian War is beginning to alter European behavior in ways the pleas, entreaties, requests, demands, and threats of three American Presidents failed to do.

With this as our guiding principle, the solution from a US perspective is practically simple, though it will require considerable political will to carry it out and persevere in the face of the inevitable wailing and gnashing of teeth it will generate. The US must stop doing for Europe what Europe could and should do for itself. This is not to say America shouldn’t liaise closely with and exercise regularly with our allies. But the active deployments, and potentially even some of the garrisons, the US has maintained explicitly in defense of Europe should be turned over to European forces.

This effort should start small and our allies should be warned well in advance of the change in US policy to allow them to prepare. The goal is not to punish our allies, just the opposite. The objective is to induce them to behave responsibly by presenting them with a choice: Attend to their own security needs or accept the risks that come with failing to do so.

A prime candidate for the initial offering in this effort would be the withdrawal of US forces in the Balkans. The US has had troops in the region as part of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission since the late 1990’s. Currently, there are 572 American personnel assigned - a number existing European NATO members could easily make up if they wished to do so. Moreover, this deployment has been effected purely to salve European fears of another Balkan conflict. Exactly the type of concern European allies could and should be dealing with out of their own resources.

Critics of this proposal will (and have) demanded a continued US presence on the basis that US troops deter aggression in ways purely European forces do not. This underlines the necessity of the action. What they are saying, in effect, is that European militaries aren’t taken as seriously as the Americans. They’re right, and that won’t change until those European forces are forced to assume more responsibility with success or failure riding on their performance.

The current global security environment is tumultuous, and getting worse. There is a major land war in Europe, another war in the Middle East, North Korea is using the Sea of Japan like a driving range for ballistic missiles, and the PRC is behaving increasingly aggressively against several of its neighbors - notably the Phillippines and Taiwan. In these circumstances the US cannot, and should not have to, militarily babysit Europe as if it were still 1945 or even 1987. There is no reason Europe cannot address the lion's share of its own security concerns out of its own resources. If the only way to induce that behavior is to stop doing it for them and force them to assume the responsibility or run the attendant risks of not doing so, so be it.

After over 160 attacks on American positions in Iraq and Syria since Oct. 17th, and over 40 attacks on civilian merchant shipping in the region, all by Iranian proxies, American military personnel have suffered their first fatal casualties. Over the weekend US soldiers stationed on the Jordan-Syria border came under drone attack by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella term for Iranian backed militias in the region, and suffered three killed in action. The Biden administration’s policy of refusing to “escalate” in the wake of attacks on our forces has failed to deter Iran. The question now is what comes next.

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In November of 2023 an idea was floated to send one or both of the US Navy’s two hospital ships into the eastern Mediterranean Sea to provide humanitarian relief to the Palestinians during the ongoing war in Gaza.  Shockingly, this was the notion of Admiral (Ret.) James Stavridis, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and former Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.  The crux of his argument was to “bring… US soft power to the war torn area.”  One might be forgiven for thinking the US had been a spectator in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians based on the article.  Unfortunately, the opposite is the case.  The US has invested heavily in soft power where the Palestinian people are concerned.  Not only has that investment failed to achieve results, but in fact, it seems to have exacerbated the conflict.

This type of reflexive humanitarian thinking is worth addressing.  First, because it occurs at very senior levels of the US military and diplomatic corps.  Second, while the sentiment to “help” in a crisis is laudable, that instinctive reaction is being carried out without due deference to US strategic interests and on behalf of people who do not deserve our charity, i.e., those openly clamoring for the killing of Americans and/or our allies.  If American money is to be sent abroad, it should be sent in service to American interests.

To understand the depth of this particular failure some numbers are helpful.  According to both the American State Department and the Congressional Research Service the United States has spent approximately $13 billion on aid to Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank since 2001.  This includes US direct aid as well as US contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA).  It’s important to keep in mind these are only US contributions, additional billions have been allocated from a collection of other nations in the hopes of addressing the ongoing plight of the Palestinians.

In exchange the US has received a series of low-level conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians, failed peace initiatives, ceasefire violations, the election of a designated terrorist group to administer Gaza, and periods of open warfare such as the one we are now all witnessing. 

The UNRWA has for years been accused of promoting antisemitism, glorifying terrorism, and advocating for the destruction of Israel and its people.  As the latest round of fighting continues, it is now fending off accusations from Israeli journalists that its employees may have participated in holding Israelis hostage for Hamas.  The UNRWA has received almost $5 billion in US tax dollars since 2001.  It was conspicuously denied funding for two years under the Trump administration (2019 and 2020) as a result of its alleged misconduct.  President Biden restored funding in 2021 to the tune of $318 million, which increased to $364M and $371M in 2022 and 2023 respectively.

The average Palestinian is, by all available data, highly radicalized.  The reason for this can be, and is, debated at length between proponents for either side of the conflict and is immaterial to this discussion.  The question must be whether pumping billions of dollars into a highly radicalized society is a good idea.  History indicates it is not.  In 2006 Hamas was given an electoral majority to govern by the Palestinians of Gaza.  Hamas subsequently purged its opposition, suspended elections, and committed to waging war on Israel.  They’ve made good on this promise over the past 17 years.  Most recently they’ve highlighted how international aid is used to fuel their war effort and the lengths they will go to to achieve their aims.

Broadly, this is supported by the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank.  Two Palestinian polling firms have done prominent mid-war polls among the Palestinian population; the Arab World for Research and Development and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.  The results speak for themselves.  The AWRAD poll conducted from Oct. 31 to Nov. 7 reported 75% support for the Oct. 7 attacks.  The PCPSR poll conducted from Nov. 22 to Dec. 2 asked if Hamas was correct to launch the Oct. 7 attack, given the Israeli response.  72% of respondents said it was the correct course; 82% in the West Bank and 57% in Gaza.  The October 7 attack boasts more support among Palestinians than any elected leader enjoys among their constituents in Western democracies.  It’s not even close.

This is not a population to whom the United States, under President Biden’s emergency funding request, should be giving a portion of $9.2 billion more taxpayer dollars.  We’ve already seen how our money is used and there is no logical reason to suppose additional funding will be treated any differently by a population that proudly professes its commitment to the annihilation of Israel.  Funding both sides of a war in which the US has a vested interest in the outcome is positively lunatic.

But, you might ask, why would you oppose sending hospital ships to assist in alleviating civilian suffering?  The better question, in my view, is why should the United States risk its vessels and its personnel to save the Palestinians from a war they wanted, and still want, according to the available data?  In my view, we shouldn’t.

Adm. Stavridis suggests positioning either the USS Mercy, USS Comfort, or both in the region to assist in alleviating the local strain on medical facilities.  The vessels could position themselves offshore and use boats or helicopters to ferry patients to and from shore.  While he acknowledges the possibility of a missile attack on the vessels, he blithely dismisses it with the assurance that the Israeli and American navies can provide sufficient escort.  There are several problems with this notion.

First, the USN has a grand total of two hospital ships, both of the Mercy-class, in our entire fleet.  Two.  They’re converted San Clemente-class supertankers built in the 1970s and retrofitted in the mid-1980s for their current role.  USS Mercy (then SS Worth) took 13 months to build while her sister ship USS Comfort (then SS Rose City) was completed in 9 months.  Both then underwent a 35 month refit for $208M per ship.  When operating with a full complement they each carry a crew of almost 1300.  The loss of one or both of these vessels would be a major blow to US naval operations capability globally and the loss of personnel, many of them highly specialized in their medical fields, would be more serious still.  The US Navy was 7,000 sailors short of its recruitment goals last year, and given current shipbuilding issues it would certainly take years to replace even one of our hospital ships with a newly built unit.

Second, and Adm. Stavridis can be forgiven for this point as he penned his opinion piece before Houthi terrorists ramped up their missile attacks, this mission would take vital escorts away from safeguarding merchant traffic in the Red Sea.  The Houthi missile and drone attacks on commercial shipping are currently a major concern for global trade and showcase the degree to which Iran has equipped some of its proxies.  Hezbollah, which is reputed to have a vast missile arsenal at its command, must therefore be considered to have at least similar capability, perhaps in even greater quantity than the Houthis.  The temptation to attempt to destroy vital US assets in the Mediterranean might prompt the Lebanon-based terror group into an open attack.  Either on their own or in conjunction with other Iranian allied groups in the region.

Third, the ability to differentiate civilians from Hamas fighters is one the Israeli ground forces continue to struggle with.  Paperwork and other credentials can be forged, and the prospect of a person having no credentials at all to verify their status as a civilian given the level of destruction in Gaza is entirely plausible on its own.  The threat of infiltration to these hospital ships and the ferrying helicopters and small boats, or the detonation of a suicide explosive, is a genuine one.  Hamas, and Palestinian terror groups more broadly, are notorious for their use of this tactic and would likely welcome the opportunity to inflict a high-profile attack on American military personnel with the possibility of significant casualties.  To say nothing of the more conventional surface-to-air or shore-to-ship threat posed by Hamas militants still operating in and around Gaza to both US helicopters and small boats.  The risk is simply untenable.

The cold facts of the matter are that America has tried soft power with respect to the Palestinians.  We have given over $13 billion in aid, we have supported peace deals, and we have argued for Israeli restraint during previous periods of hostility.  All of this has failed.  Throwing good money after bad and risking critical US assets and their personnel on some quixotic notion that this time will be different, is pure folly.  It is also an unconscionable risk to the sailors who may be killed or injured carrying it out.  It’s time to let Israeli hard power have a turn and for the United States to keep well out of the “humanitarian” game.

[i] Data collected from:
The Congressional Research Service’s report: “The Palestinians: Background and US Relations”
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34074

The US State Department’s reporting of UNRWA Assistance for 2002.
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/13688.htm

The Washington Posts reporting of UNRWA contributions for 2023

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/11/unrwa-gaza-humanitarian-aid-congress/

ForeignAssistance.gov’s tracking chart for US aid to Gaza and the West Bank
https://www.foreignassistance.gov/cd/west-bank-gaza/

Once again, it’s time to confound our favorite communist dictator.  This series of articles focuses on potential measures the US government could take that would have an swift impact on the threat posed to the United States by the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  Last week I discussed ending the practice of educating the PRCs population in our schools so that we might make infiltration of the US harder and cease augmenting the PRCs pool of technically proficient citizens.  This week, I’ll be addressing PRC property holdings in the US.

According to a 2021 Department of Agriculture report, the PRC directly or indirectly, through US flagged companies with PRC shareholders, owns around 384,000 acres of US agricultural land.  137,000 acres of that total was acquired between 2019-2021.  Moreover the PRC, or PRC nationals, spent around $6.1B* on US real estate in 2021 according to the National Association of Realtors.  The American Enterprise Institute estimates total PRC real estate investments between 2005-2022 at just north of $32B.  While these investments are not overwhelming, PRC controlled agricultural land comprises 0.9% of all foreign controlled agricultural land holdings, they are significant in several ways.

First several PRC agricultural land purchases are in close proximity to US military installations like Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota, raising national security concerns regarding possible intelligence gathering activities.  Second, while the overall percentage of land is small, it is still almost 400,000 acres of US agricultural land.  Additionally the size of PRC holdings have rapidly increased in recent years, raising to prospect of a threat to US food security if the trend is allowed to continue unchecked.  This has prompted Governor of Florida, Ron DeSantis, to consider asking his state Legislature for legislation banning the PRC from land purchases in his state.  Similarly the PASS Act to prevent foreign acquisition of US farmland has been introduce in Congress.  This issue also isn’t unique to the US, Canada has now prohibited foreigners from buying property and begun forcing some PRC firms to divest themselves of critical mining operations within the country on national security grounds.

Even should such bans on the purchase of private property by individuals or corporations with links to the PRC pass at the State and Federal level in the US, the problem of existing holdings will still remain.  The question then becomes what to do about such residual holdings?  Eminent domain law would appear to hold the answer.

Eminent domain, in lay terms, is the ability of the government at the State or Federal level to confiscate private property in whole or part in service to the public good, as long as compensation is provided to the owner as stipulated under the 5^th Amendment of the US Constitution.  While traditionally this has been used primarily to facilitate infrastructure projects, public works, parks, and environmental projects, there have been notable exceptions.  During the Second World War eminent domain was used to acquire more than 20 million acres of private land to facilitate the war effort, everything from military facilities to wartime manufacturing and storage depots were built on the properties.  Additionally, the Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London, although provoking significant controversy, held that economic benefits are a permissible form of public use that can justify the seizing of private property.  Taken in combination, these precedents create an interesting possibility.

The wartime precedent during WWII confirms that eminent domain may be used on national security grounds.  The PRC is unquestionably a national security threat to the US.  The Kelo decision opens the economic door for the government.  American citizens owning an additional 400,000 acres of US agricultural land, in addition to billions of dollars more in other real estate holdings, would certainly be of a greater economic benefit to the country than that same land being held directly or indirectly by hostile foreign actors.  The argument almost writes itself.

The US Government could move to condemn and acquire property held, directly or indirectly, by PRC nationals or corporations on both grounds.  The property owners would necessarily be compensated in accordance with constitutional requirements.  The seized properties could then be sold to domestic or friendly foreign interests, preferably to private American citizens.

While this type of heavy handed action is rightly distasteful to those of us who value private property rights as an inherent good, there is a distinction to be made in this case.  These measures should not be employed by against any US citizen or entity not acting as a proxy for PRC interests in the United States.  Were this course of action to be taken, it would be of paramount importance to highlight the external national security threat of the PRC as the premise.  Weaponization of eminent domain against domestic concerns on the pretext of national security would be a catastrophic premise to establish.

The economic, intellectual, and political infiltration of the United States by the PRC is a critical national security threat.  Removing the ability of the PRC to acquire property or influence in the US agricultural and real estate markets impedes that infiltration.  While tactics like the employment of eminent domain and purchasing bans may go against free market principles, so does the increased power of Communist China.  In my opinion, the benefits of these tactics make them well worth careful examination.

*Author’s Note:  This figure from the NAR includes Taiwanese nationals, the actual dollar value from PRC real estate purchases is therefore somewhat lower.

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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the most dangerous geopolitical threat the United States faces from another nation state today.  Yet only recently has the US government made any serious attempt to economically decouple from it or check its expansionism around the globe.  Still more work is required to reverse PRC infiltration and influence operations targeting public and private US institutions.  To that end, there are steps the US government could take to hinder PRC operations that could be implemented with more swiftness than is generally supposed.  The purpose of these articles is to elaborate on some of those measures.

Legal physical access to the United States remains a boon to PRC infiltration efforts.  Whether it be PRC nationals attending US institutions of higher education under orders to secure technology for their government, the infiltration of American scientific centers, industrial espionage efforts against US corporations, or attempts to compromise American elected officials.  To say nothing of the PRC setting up “police stations” within the United States in a direct attempt to undermine our sovereignty on our own territory.  Beijing clearly see’s legal entry into the United States as a weapon it can use to attack America.  It’s long past time to deprive Communist China of that weapon.

This is shockingly easy, if the political will to invoke existing US statutes is present in the executive branch.  Under 22 CFR § 41.122 the grounds for revocation of a non-immigrant visa are as follows:

“A consular officer, the Secretary, or a Department official to whom the Secretary has delegated this authority is authorized to revoke a nonimmigrant visa at any time, in his or her discretion.”

Yes, you read that correctly.  The Secretary of State, on his own or if so ordered by the President, could revoke every outstanding non-immigrant visa held by a PRC national tomorrow.  Those visa holders would then be forced to leave or face active deportation, there is no recourse provided under the statute when the revocation comes on the order of the Secretary.  All that is lacking is the political will to take such a step.

Assuming such political fortitude ever manifests itself within the US government, the question then becomes which visas should be revoked?  In the opinion of this author the ideal answer is all but diplomatic and a very few tourist visas.  However, a good initial step might be to revoke whatever portion of the almost 380,000 Category F student visas issued to PRC nationals in the last 5 years (2018-2022) are still in effect, then decline all further requests.  Another good initial candidate for revocation might be the over 95,000 Category H work visas issued to PRC nationals during the same five year period, followed by the same refusal to issue.  The State Department has issued over 3.3 million non-immigrant visas to PRC nationals in the last five years.

Beijing would certainly have something to say about such an action.  The predictable accusations of racism would be shouted in every media outlet and international forum.  Sob stories about PRC youth just wanting to learn in good schools would follow.  There would be public wailing and gnashing of teeth over PRC nationals being denied jobs in America.  Some reciprocal deportation of American citizens from the PRC would also be likely.  We could expect the PRC to play its victim card to the hilt.

The refutation of Beijing’s feigned outrage in the court of world opinion would likewise require some backbone from America’s diplomatic corps.   However, any such confrontation would see the United States well supplied with ammunition to justify the decision.  Publicly releasing documentation on the litany of PRC espionage operations carried out against the US in the last 25 years alone would give the US ample justification for a drastic reduction in visas issued to PRC nationals.  If the American government has the will to make the case to the rest of the world.

The threat from PRC nationals legally entering the US in order to engage in espionage activities is voluminously documented.  The costs of failing to deal with this threat for decades have already been significant.  Addressing this issue decisively and swiftly is well within the ability of each US administration.  All that is lacking is the will to do so.

President Putin recently renewed Russian nuclear saber rattling during his Sept. 21 mobilization speech, following a series of conventional setbacks in the Russo-Ukrainian War.  The Biden administration has warned of “catastrophic consequences” should Russia initiate a nuclear strike and the President has stated that the threat of “nuclear Armageddon” is at its highest level in 60 years – a clear reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.  Unfortunately, while the American Government may be saying some of the correct things, it isn’t taking any of the required actions commensurate with its rhetoric.  Russia ignores Western speeches; it pays attention to Western action.

               A great deal of recent writing and commentary surrounding the statements of Vladimir Putin has centered on the question of what to do if Russia uses a nucleal weapon in Ukraine.  This is fundamentally incorrect.  It’s a reactive mindset in line with the critical lack of initiative that has become a hallmark of US/NATO policy when dealing with Russia.  The correct course of action is to determine how we can prevent Russia from using a nuclear device in the first place.  The answer falls squarely under traditional US nuclear deterrence strategy as it evolved during the Cold War.

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Whether Putin’s aims during such an operation would be limited or a general invasion of conquest is a subject of intense debate, and likely known only to the Russian President.  While casualties and equipment losses could be severe in either case, Russia still currently has a sufficient military capability to force a favorable outcome.  Presupposing any losses during the fighting and the cost of subsequent occupation and rebuilding were acceptable to Putin, the reaction from the EU and NATO remains the biggest deterrent element he faces.  Or is it?

While Putin provides the military muscle, to a great extent, it is Western political leaders who are providing the political environment crucial to his success.  Currently, there have been no significant deterrence measures taken against Russia in response to its military buildup and increasing pro-war/anti-west propaganda.  There have been no additional sanctions levied by the EU, G7, or the US.  Significant reluctance has already been expressed on even discussing sanctions by several European states.  There has been no significant deployment of additional NATO assets to the eastern flank of the alliance, nor has there been a significant increase in the military aid being sent to Ukraine.  The only thing President Biden and European leaders have committed to do is talk.  Nothing more.

This tells Putin the West has neither the will nor, in some cases, the capability to oppose further Russian military action in Ukraine.  If the European powers do suddenly coalesce in strident opposition to Russian aggression, Russia can play the natural gas card mid-winter when European supplies are low.  The hint of such a threat to shut off natural gas supplies to Europe has already skyrocketed energy prices to such a degree that American exporters are directing LNG loaded vessels into European ports to take advantage of the shortage. 

President Biden has similarly declined to support Ukraine seriously, aside from diplomatic engagement with Moscow and a small increase in the military aid given to Kyiv.  Moreover, the US military is still reeling from its defeat in Afghanistan, struggling to reorient away from counterinsurgency operations back toward peer-level conflict, and suffering from low morale and an erosion of public confidence.  The situation is not conducive to new deployments, and the Europeans are unlikely to engage in unilateral deployments without US support.

Of course, Ukraine and its military would vigorously resist a renewed Russian offensive into its territory and fortunately, Ukraine has vastly improved its own posture in the intervening 7 years since the Russian invasion of 2014.  Its 120,000 military personnel of 2014 has increased to over a quarter million active duty personnel, with almost a million more reservists that could be called on in the event of war.  What it lacks is enough modern weaponry to arm these personnel to a level that would make them effective against Russian forces.  Bowing to Putin, Germany has actually attempted to block arms shipments, as reports recently revealed, and the US has shied away from aggressively supplying Kyiv’s needs.  This deficiency, and the failure of NATO to address it, are immense gifts to Russia.

Russia now has a window of opportunity to act against Ukraine without suffering the severe international consequences it otherwise might and before Ukraine can fully arm herself.  Analysts have widely recognized the need for the seasonal Rasputitsa (mud) in Ukraine to freeze before an invasion with heavy armored and mechanized forces could begin.  This is true, and the December-January time frame for such a freeze coincides with the kind of heavy winter energy use in Western Europe that will make it most sensitive to Russian threats to cut off its supplies of natural gas.  Therefore, if Russia moves, she will do so in winter, after the freeze.

Putin must act before the democracies that might otherwise oppose him can sort out their internal issues.  The Europeans finally being embarrassed or shamed into reorienting themselves away from dependence on Russian natural gas could remove a major element of leverage Russia will use to shield herself from repercussion from a Ukrainian invasion.  While the near lunatic hatred of various European green parties for fossil fuels and nuclear energy alike make this unlikely (they continue to champion more “green” sources as the solution even now), and in fact have directly engineered Russia’s leverage in this matter, a major European land war could shatter this position for the public.  Fortunately for Russia, absent an actual invasion of Ukraine, these policies are unlikely to change.  However, the longer this period of tension continues, the more likely the European elements of NATO are to act in some way, just to be seen doing something. 

On the American front, President Biden is an unimaginable gift to Putin.  Feckless, weak, incompetent, and widely mocked by his own nation, Biden already has a string of foreign policy disasters to his credit after less than a year in office.  His refusal to lead NATO on the issue of Ukraine and persistent public statements that he wishes to talk to Putin, coupled with tepid support for Ukraine, indicate an unwillingness by his administration to seriously oppose Russia.  Unfortunately for Moscow, the US is set to endure another round of elections in 2022, and they do not look good for the President’s party.  A hardline American Congress could force a spineless Biden Administration to take action whether it wants to or not.  Massive arms shipments to Ukraine, coupled with intelligence sharing, and other modes of support would make any invasion much more difficult.

While Ukraine has been franticly rearming out of her own resources,  unfortunately, those resources are somewhat limited, and outside support has been sporadic.  If Russia wishes to strike again, it must do so before Ukraine can become more fully armed with Western quality weapons.  Overrunning a determined, but poorly armed Ukrainian military would be a far easier task than confronting that same force after political changes potentially open up the floodgates of foreign aid.  For Putin, the sooner, the better.

If President Putin is prepared to accept the costs of the invasion and occupation of all or part of Ukraine, it is unlikely there will ever be a better time than now to launch offensive operations.  Europe is irresolute, economically compromised, and politically fractured.  Ukraine is determined, but poorly equipped to stand off another invasion.  The United States is bereft of the leadership that might otherwise rectify these problems.  It is unlikely that such a confluence of favorable conditions will reoccur before Ukraine and the West can strengthen their positions.  If the military solution is the one favored by Moscow, it should invade Ukraine early in the new year.

              Vladimir Putin is perhaps the ultimate realist, in the worst sense of that term.  A former counter-intelligence officer with the KGB, Putin’s brand of realpolitik values force.  He has no respect for and does not value international norms, treaties, agreements, or institutions, save when it benefits him to do so.  It is no surprise then that Putin seems unperturbed by all the West’s talk of sanctions and repercussions in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine.  At the end of the day, he knows that the international pressure will eventually dissipate and Russian troops will remain where he put them.

              The West, by contrast, is headed by Wilsonian internationalists who view norms, treaties, and institutions as sacrosanct.  They have a difficult time coming to grips with the fact that there still exists a leader who views the use of military force to acquire territory as acceptable (and sometimes preferable).  Unfortunately, when they condemn what they regard as Putin’s rogue state actions, they use terminology that simply does not register with his realpolitik mindset.  Continued refusal by NATO to shadow Russian force buildup/exercises with corresponding allied operations within NATO territory only underlines the credibility gap between their deterrence rhetoric, and the actions they are willing to take to halt Russian aggression.

              Having discussed Putin and outlined his worldview, his opposite numbers in both NATO and the United States deserve some examination in order to illustrate the contrast between Presidents Putin and Biden and Secretary-General of NATO Stoltenberg.  Jens Stoltenberg, a career Norwegian politician and former Prime Minister of Norway, has been Secretary-General of NATO since 2014 – the same year Russia invaded and annexed Crimea.  In 2015 he said "I believe we don't see any immediate threat against any NATO country from the east… Our goal is still cooperation with Russia…”  While recently chastising Russia for non-transparency in its military buildup along the border with Ukraine, he offered continued training and material assistance to the Ukrainian Government and reaffirmed that NATO does not and “will not accept Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea.”  He also called on Russia to reduce tensions.  Stoltenberg as the titular head of NATO ought, along with US President Biden, to be reading Russia the riot act over its blatant and unprovoked aggression towards its neighbors.  Instead, he seems to think internationalist word salad will impress a realpolitik carnivore like Putin.

              Putin knows that as the driver of this crisis he is in complete control. He can ramp up or reduce the level of tension as he chooses, regardless of NATO’s wishes, because NATO has not imposed a cost for his behavior and is unlikely to do so.  The NATO Secretary-General can give as many speeches about refusing to recognize the annexation of Crimea as he likes, Russian troops are still occupying that territory and NATO has taken no steps, political or military, that would force their removal.  Moreover, what the Sec. Gen. did not say was the most important part of that speech: he did not announce any defense commitment or re/deployment of NATO forces in response to the Russian buildup along Ukraine’s borders.  Stoltenberg has surrendered the initiative to the Russians.

              The American example (and leadership) is no better.  President Joe Biden has rapidly become one of the most incompetent and widely mocked leaders in his nation’s history, while internationally his tenure has been marked by a series of disasters.  The termination of the Afghan War was a colossal military failure that strained the NATO alliance, producing severe tensions and recriminations between the US and its allies.  The Biden administration helped to derail the Franco-Australian submarine deal, infuriating the French and causing them to withdraw their ambassador from Washington for the first time in the history of diplomatic relations between the two countries.  The removal of sanctions from the Nordstream-2 Project, reversing the previous administration’s stance, was a major gift of economic leverage to the Russians and a reward for the feckless foreign policy of the Germans.  All of this considerable damage to American credibility has been accomplished in the first eleven months of his presidency and is in addition to President Biden’s own very questionable personal qualities as a world leader. 

From the Russian perspective, this is a domestically weakened and embattled American President who already has a track record of military and foreign policy disasters, despite being in office less than a year.  While transcripts for the most recent face-to-face teleconference between Biden and Putin have not been released, the US State Department indicated Biden promised unprecedented sanctions and other measures should Russia invade Ukraine again.  Without knowing the details, there are still two problems with that response.  First, Biden’s own history of going soft on previous Russian sanctions renders his threats less credible than they might otherwise be.  Second, increased troop deployment to the region should be done prior to any Russian invasion as a deterrence measure.  Sending them after invasion begins is useless in a deterrence capacity unless you plan to actually use them in support of Ukraine which Biden says he categorically will not.

So far Putin has no reason to take NATO seriously because NATO has not yet given him one.  What it has given him is a great deal of rhetoric, minor troop deployments, isolated and intermittent sanctions, and inaction.  This tells him that as long as he is willing to weather the resulting (likely temporary) sanctions, Russia can do as it wishes in Ukraine.  This then begs the question, “How could NATO deter Russia?”

The deterrence of Russian aggression comes in three forms: diplomatic, economic, and military.  The first two must be exercised especially aggressively in order to be effective.  Whatever measures are used, NATO must develop a strategic game plan for deterrence and execute it.  As it stands, the alliance has allowed Russia to set the pace of escalation and manipulate events along a timetable most beneficial to Moscow.  This is especially dangerous as it allows an aggressive Russia to control events without being forced to reexamine the strategic situation in light of NATO counter moves.  Impeding this strategic momentum is a worthwhile goal in and of itself.

              Diplomatically, NATO has few active options.  As previously discussed, Russian respect for international diplomacy is limited, and few methods of formal direct censure are available to NATO member states.  Ejecting diplomats and suspected intelligence operatives is only of limited value and Russia will veto any meaningful moves at the UN.  Therefore, NATO diplomacy should be focused on areas outside Russia that pose concerns to Moscow.  Using Russian aggression in Ukraine to pitch NATO membership to Finland and possibly Sweden is a prime example.  Moscow complains vociferously that it is being encircled, but ironically it has now given NATO an opportunity to further tighten that circle, by showing additional nations on Russia’s borders that they are not safe from its depredations unless they join NATO. 

              Internally NATO can also do some housecleaning of members who have not been living up to their commitments to the alliance.  Certain large, economically strong members chronically refuse to carry their fair share of the mutual defense burden by refusing to meet or come close to NATO’s 2% of GDP minimum for defense spending.  Removing their voting rights, or threatening the expulsion of members who fail to maintain a credible military force capable of assisting in the mutual defense, or those that undermine NATOs economic security – Articles 3 and 2 of the NATO Charter respectively – would send a strong and long overdue message both internally and externally.  Internal reform along these lines has been badly needed for decades and this presents a good opportunity to initiate it.

              Economically, NATO is in much better shape.  For all its rejection of international norms, Russia and its ruling clique are highly dependent on its energy exports and access to the international banking and payments systems. Reducing Russian access to European energy markets and to those critical banking services would severely pressure both the nation as a whole and the oligarchs, whom even Putin must be wary of offending.  Freezing or seizing assets and accounts linked to the Russian Government, its prominent citizens, and corporations as a retaliatory measure for aggression is well precedented.  Moreover, these measures can be targeted at those individuals and entities most in a position to pressure Putin.

              Cutting Russia off from major sources of international energy revenue is a more time-consuming prospect, but also carries with it significant long term benefits.  European NATO members pay Gazprom, Russia’s state energy exporter, billions of dollars a year for its products.  Many of these same products are produced in the volumes necessary for export within the United States and Canada – especially natural gas.  A concerted effort by the alliance and its members to redirect energy and other imports away from Russian sources and toward neutral or ideally, NATO aligned exporting nations might be somewhat slow and perhaps more expensive.  However, it would profoundly impact the Russian economy and defang a major point of leverage Russia continues to hold over much of Europe.

              This article assumes direct overt military action against Russian interests is a nonstarter.  Nevertheless, NATO’s indirect military options are numerous.  They range from significantly enhanced direct aid to Ukraine, all the way to the initiation of allied grey-zone operations in the conflict zones of Ukraine.  While even deniable direct action carries serious risk, most of the military options available are both non-confrontational and send a clear message to Putin.

              Secretary-General Stoltenberg, to his credit, has continued to emphasize aid in the form of equipment and training to non-NATO members under threat of Russian aggression.  Building up friendly “non-allied” nations to the point their internal strength causes Moscow to reassess the cost-benefit analysis of direct action anywhere in the region is a critical deterrence goal.  It allows NATO to function as the proverbial “Arsenal of Democracy” without significant risk to itself.  It also serves to more closely align these “non-allied” nations with NATO through the use of common equipment and the personal military contacts related to training and support that come with it.  Given current tensions, aid programs should be increased wherever possible – to the point of lend-lease status if necessary – and they should be carried out at least semi-openly.  The goal is not only to strengthen Ukraine and Russia’s “non-allied” neighbors, but for Russia to see these nations being strengthened by NATO.

              Internally NATO can take significant military action to both preposition itself and send an unambiguous signal to Putin that aggression will be responded to.  During the Trump administration, Poland offered to permanently billet a US armored division on its soil.  These talks should be openly restarted with an eye towards the forward deployment of the 1st Armored Division, along with the headquarters elements of a reactivated US VII Corps within Poland.  If talks are successful, the 1st and 3rd US Infantry Divisions should be openly reorganized into the VII Corps command structure and forward posts established for them.  This sends an especially poignant message to a cold warrior like Putin, who will recall that VII Corps was a major component of NATO’s old Army Group Center (CENTAG) based in West Germany during the Cold War and specifically designed to resist a Russian/Warsaw Pact invasion.  If Russia wishes to behave like the USSR, NATO should be prepared to treat it accordingly.

              Alternatively, NATO can also take significant action without major troop deployments from the US.  The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) is a brigade-sized, combined arms rapid reaction force specifically stood up following the last Russian invasion of Ukraine in order to allow NATO to move swiftly in the face of further aggression.  It should be activated immediately along with its two reinforcement brigades, its constituent components assembled, and deployed for an extensive period of training and integration exercises in preparation for possible real-world crisis deployment.

              Where it does this training is potentially critical.  Poland or Romania would place it in a NATO member state bordering Ukraine and therefore close to the point of likely conflict while remaining in NATO territory.  Should President Zelensky specifically request a joint training exercise, the VJTF could conceivably conduct this division-sized training operation in western Ukraine.  While remote from the potential areas of Russian incursion, this calculated signal would be seen as provocative in the extreme from a Russian point of view.  It does several things for NATO:

              First, reminiscent of Syria, it establishes a NATO deconfliction tripwire in Ukraine that Putin will have to recognize and hesitate to cross, and it does so without NATO formally committing itself to the defense of Ukraine.  This removes the troublesome Article 5 issue of Ukraine joining the alliance while portions of its territory are still occupied by Russia.  Second, it sends an unambiguous message to Putin that his antics have reached a stage NATO is no longer prepared to tolerate and that the alliance is prepared to act in unconventional ways to respond.  Third, it sets a narrative trap.  Diplomatically Russia will almost certainly characterize this as an act of NATO aggression.  But how can Russia object to NATO trainers in western Ukraine, while Russia itself occupies eastern Ukraine? NATO can easily use this charge to highlight Russian troops on Ukrainian soil in Crimea, its continued participation in the proxy war going on in the Donbas Region of Ukraine, and to remind other “non-allied” nations that border Russia that they could be next on Moscow’s agenda. 

              The most potentially escalatory measure NATO could take would be to fight fire with fire and embrace proxy war in the Donbas and Crimea. Unlike the other measures listed above, this would have to be a completely deniable measure, carried out without formal recognition of any kind.  Its impact would be somewhat delayed, but potentially more pointed: increased Russian casualties.  American and allied Special Forces units, especially Polish GROM and British Special Forces have just concluded their operations in a two decade long counter-insurgency war.  The level of combat experience accrued by these formations in the War on Terror is hard to overemphasize and would give them a definite edge over Russian deniable assets operating in the area.  The damage they, or NATO military personnel operating officially as PMCs under contract to Kyiv, could do to Russian assets in the field is significant in terms of personnel, morale, material, and local support.  Operational realities also mean that eventually NATO would take casualties, and the potential for provable discovery of these forces by Russia carries a major risk of conflict escalation.  This option is the riskiest both politically and militarily and is therefore the least likely to be employed.  

              None of these options should be taken in isolation, and all are viable within the context of their inherent limitations.  A combination of them should be employed by NATO with the overarching goal of speaking to Putin in the language he understands.  Rhetoric alone is not enough.  The objective must be to increase the political, economic, and military costs – real and potential – of any Russian aggression to the point that Moscow views aggression as an unattractive strategy.